Incentives for experimenting agents

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent who undertakes experiments and a principal who provides the requisite funding. A dynamic agency cost arises—the more lucrative the agent's stream of rents following a failure, the more costly are current incentives, giving the principal a motivation to reduce the project's continuation value. We characterize the set of recursive Markov equilibria. Efficient equilibria front‐load the agent's effort, inducing maximum experimentation over an initial period, until switching to the worst possible continuation equilibrium. The initial phase concentrates effort near the beginning, when most valuable, whereas the switch attenuates the dynamic agency cost.     

Measuring the Costs of Custom Products through Better Technology Utilization

This case study details the process of determining the economic feasibility of implementing lean manufacturing in a small mass customization manufacturing company in the medical industry. The case study investigates the information required for a lean implementation and proposes a number of changes to the work procedures (including instrumentation) to obtain the data. A large number of enterprise resource planning systems were evaluated for their suitability to track data in the mass customization environment and the top candidates are compared in the article. The current labor and materials costs are estimated to determine the magnitude of potential savings to support the changes. Based on the analysis the recommended solution has a payback period of approximately two years.     

BUYING LOCALLY

‘‘Buy local” arrangements encourage members of a community or group to patronize one another instead of the external economy. They range from formal mechanisms such as local currencies to informal “I'll buy from you if you buy from me” arrangements and are often championed on social or environmental grounds. We show that in a monopolistically competitive economy, buy local arrangements can have salutary effects even for selfish agents immune to social or environmental considerations. Buy local arrangements effectively allow firms to exploit the equilibrium price–cost gap to profitably expand their sales at the going price.     

Achieving destination competitiveness: an importance–performance analysis of Serbia

As a relatively new and under-researched tourism destination, Serbia provides an interesting context to assess destination competitiveness in conditions of global environmental changes and the additional challenges of transition from a socialist economy to a market-based economy. This article uses importance–performance analysis (IPA) to assess the importance of different activities to underpin tourism development in Serbia, as well as the industry's perceived performance in respect of these activities. There are a number of areas in which Serbian tourism industry considers itself to be underperforming in the implementation of activities to maintain destination competitiveness. This article analyses these results in detail using IPA as a diagnostic tool. Particular attention is paid to investigating the implications of the findings for both destination managers and private tourism operators in Serbia that can assist them to develop a focused action agenda to achieve and maintain destination competitive advantage. The approach can be used in other destinations to assess tourism ability to meet the challenges of global trends.     

Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues

Payments for environmental services (PES) have attracted increasing interest as a mechanism to translate external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services (ES). In this introductory paper, we set the stage for the rest of this Special Issue of Ecological Economics by reviewing the main issues arising in PES design and implementation and discussing these in the light of environmental economics. We start with a discussion of PES definition and scope. We proceed to review some of the principal dimensions and design characteristics of PES programs and then analyze how PES compares to alternative policy instruments. Finally, we examine in detail two important aspects of PES programs: their effectiveness and their distributional implications.PES is not a silver bullet that can be used to address any environmental problem, but a tool tailored to address a specific set of problems: those in which ecosystems are mismanaged because many of their benefits are externalities from the perspective of ecosystem managers. PES is based on the beneficiary-pays rather than the polluter-pays principle, and as such is attractive in settings where ES providers are poor, marginalized landholders or powerful groups of actors. An important distinction within PES is between user-financed PES in which the buyers are the users of the ES, and government-financed PES in which the buyers are others (typically the government) acting on behalf of ES users. In practice, PES programs differ in the type and scale of ES demand, the payment source, the type of activity paid for, the performance measure used, as well as the payment mode and amount. The effectiveness and efficiency of PES depends crucially on program design.     

Performance Payments for Groups: The Case of Carnivore Conservation in Northern Sweden

This paper presents a first empirical assessment of carnivore conservation under a performance payment scheme. In Sweden, reindeer herder villages are paid based on the number of lynx (lynx lynx) and wolverine (gulo gulo) offspring certified on their pastures. The villages decide on the internal payment distribution. It is generally assumed that benefit distribution rules are exogenous. We investigate them as an endogenous decision. The data reveals that villages’ group size has a direct negative effect on conservation outcomes and an indirect positive effect which impacts conservation outcomes through the benefit distribution rule. This result revises the collective action hypothesis on purely negative effects of group size.     

Least convex capacities

Summary. Debreu proposed the notion of `least concave utility' as a way to disentangle risk attitudes from the certainty preferences embedded in a von-Neumann Morgenstern index. This paper studies preferences under uncertainty, as opposed to risk, and examines a corresponding decomposition of preference. The analysis is carried out within the Choquet expected utility model of preference and is centered on the notion of a least convex capacity. Received: May 7, 1997; revised version: November 5, 1997     

Dominant Firm Pricing with Competitive Entry and Regulation: The Case of IntraLATA Toll

In this paper, we develop a generalized model of a dominant firm-competitive fringe industry in which products are differentiated, costs vary across suppliers, and the dominant firm is subject to alternative regulatory regimes. The model yields an equilibrium condition that can be tested empirically using data on Bell Operating Companies' pricing of intraLATA toll telephone service. Estimation of a reduced form price equation provides strong support for the theoretical model. Of particular interest, the results suggest that dominant firm (Bell Operating Company) toll prices are driven down by the presence of actual and potential fringe competitors (interexchange carriers) when entry is authorized by the state. Additionally, the results fail to provide evidence that the introduction of incentive regulation or price-cap regulation has reduced intraLATA toll prices.     

International price competitiveness of Australia's MICE industry

A special‐interest tourist market that holds out great promise for continued growth well into the next century is that of MICE (meetings, incentives, conventions, exhibitions). At the same time, changing prices in particular destinations relative to others are regarded as one of the most important economic influences on destination shares of total international tourism flows. The question arises as to the price competitiveness of major competing MICE destinations. Although earlier research has recognised that a destination's price competitiveness differs according to a visitor's country of origin there has been relatively little attention paid to tourism price competitiveness from the perspective of those having different motives for travel. This paper has four major aims: first, to provide a method by which price competitiveness of tourism by journey purpose can be estimated; second, to construct price competitiveness indices that measure, absolutely and relative to major competitors world‐wide, the price competitiveness of Australia's MICE tourism industry; third, to compare Australia's price competitiveness as a MICE destination with its price competitiveness for total inbound tourism; fourth, to discuss the implications of the results for travel and tourism decision‐makers in both the private and public sectors. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

External validity of economic experiments on Agri-environmental scheme design

The use of laboratory experiments to study issues in agricultural policy has grown in prominence within the fields of agricultural and environmental economics. Such experiments are often conducted with university students and framed in an abstract manner. This raises questions about whether the findings of these experiments provide reliable insights on the behaviour of actual agents in real settings. We contribute to this methodological debate by analysing the impacts of sample population and framing on behaviour in the experiment and on two policy effects: the direction and the magnitude of the policy impact. We also examine the channels through which differences in results may occur. For this, we test if behaviour is correlated with a set of covariates collected from our samples, including socio-demographics, social and risk preferences. Our main finding is that the type of subject significantly affects the magnitude of the policy impact. The two populations differ substantially in the representation of key characteristics and preferences, which in consequence affects behaviour in the experiment. We find no significant impact of framing on behaviour.